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Abstract 
This study examines the persistence of software piracy with internet penetration vis-à-vis of PC 
users, conditional on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) institutions. The empirical evidence is 
based on a panel of 99 countries for the period 1994-2010 and the Generalised Method of 
Moments. The main finding is that, compared to internet penetration, PC usage is more 
responsible for the persistence of global software piracy. Knowing how technology affects the 
persistence of piracy is important because it enables more targeted policy initiatives. We show 
that the sensitivity of software piracy to IPRs mechanisms is contingent on the specific 
technology channels through which the pirated software is consumed.  
 
JEL Classification: F42; K42; O34; O38; O57 
Keywords: Piracy; Business Software; Software piracy; Intellectual Property Rights  
 
 
1. Introduction  
There are two main motivations for the positioning of our inquiry on technology and persistence 
in global software piracy, notably: the growing role of the knowledge economy (KE) in the 21st 
century development and the gaps in the literature on fighting global software piracy. There is a 
broad consensus in the position that a key driver of contemporary global economic development 
is KE: a phenomenon that is essential in competitive economic development because it 
represents policies associated with the production and distribution of knowledge for economic 
development (Hashim, 2014; Asongu et al., 2018a). 
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  An essential factor of competition is the degree to which Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs) and Intellectual Property (IP) are consolidated within an economy1. It follows that 
mechanisms of IPRs and IP protection play a key role in competition needed for KE in cross-
country comparative economic development of nations in the world2. The underlying linkages 
are relevant in the perspective that IPRs and IP are closely connected to the four dimensions of 
the World Bank’s KE index, namely: information and communication technology (ICT), 
economic incentives and institutional regime, innovation and education (Asongu, 2014a)3. 
Accordingly, IPRs and IP laws affect the production and distribution of knowledge. When they 
are less stringent, they limit the production of knowledge but increase the distribution of the 
knowledge. This is essentially because less tight IP limits incentives to knowledge production 
because those producing such knowledge do not have enough incentives to continue innovating 
because they are not sufficiently compensated through the protection of their attendant IPRs. 
Conversely, when such IPRs and IP laws are more stringent, they increase the production of 
knowledge and limit the distribution of such knowledge. This is also because of limited 
distribution owing to the fact that upholding IPRs restrict the distribution of knowledge 
exclusively to those in society who can afford to pay in order to benefit from the knowledge. 
Hence, the nature of IPRs and IP laws is closely associated with KE because KE is how a society 
benefits from the way knowledge is produced and distributed for economic development.  
 In  light of the above, the importance of KE today extends a relevant debate on the 
essence of IPRs in the development process. Whereas there is some consensus in the literature 
that the tightness or stringency of IPRs should move hand-in-hand with economic development, 
some scholars still maintain that strict IPRs are core in the transition from developing to 
developed countries (Mansfield,1994; Maskus & Penubarti, 1995; Seyoum, 1996; Lee & 
Mansfield, 1996). To put the argument into more perspective, there is a broad stream of literature 
                         
1
 This assertion may be true sometimes, but not always as manifested in the rise of the competitive Chinese 
economy, which has a poor record of intellectual property protection (Ang et al., 2014). 
2The IPRs channels include: inclusion of property rights in a country’s constitution, IPR law, main IP law, World 
Intellectual Property Rights Organization (WIPO) treaties, bilateral treaties and multilateral treaties. 
3(i) ICT facilitates the effective creation, processing and dissemination of information. (ii) An economic incentive 
and institutional regime provides the motivation for the flourishing of entrepreneurs and efficient utilization of new 
knowledge. (iii) Innovation represents an efficient innovation system of consultants, research centers, firms, 
universities and other organizations to utilize the burgeoning stock of global knowledge, create new technology and 
adapt as well as assimilate these to local needs. (iv) Education entails a skilled and an educated population that use 
and share existing knowledge efficiently, as well as create knowledge. 
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maintaining that in order to enhance catch-up processes of development, reverse engineering in 
developing countries is important, at least in the short run. The argument essentially builds on 
the reality that technology in less developed countries is more adaptive and imitative in nature 
(Maskus & Penubarti, 1995; Mansfield 1994; Seyoum, 1996; Lee & Mansfield, 1996)4. This has 
motivated the proliferation of technologies that are employed to pirate, imitate and copy KE 
commodities (Asongu et al., 2019). Upon reviewing contemporary literature on the subject, 
while there are considerably and justifiable issues surrounding software piracy5, a consensus is 
lacking in the debate on the consolidation of IPRs in the industry of software.  
 Central to the debate on IPRs protection are two main schools of thought. The first school 
maintains that adherence to tight IPRs encourage economic progress and development catch-up 
(Gould & Gruben 1996; Falvey et al., 2006). The school argues that the positive relationship 
between tight IPRs and economic development is facilitated by the positive externalities of strict 
IPRs on factors of productivity. In other words, the school maintains that stringent IPRs 
encourage innovation and improvements in total factor productivity because IPRs holders are 
provided with more incentives to innovate and produce new knowledge. It is also important to 
note that while the first school favors the production of knowledge, it reduces the smooth 
distribution of knowledge produced. This is essentially because stringent IPRs discourage 
replication and innovation that are essential for the dissemination of existing innovation and 
knowledge for economic development. Conversely, the second school perceives the adoption of 
stringent IPRs as unfavorable to economic progress and development catch-up (Yang & Maskus, 
2001; Andrés & Goel 2011, 2012). The argument which extends to the ratification of 
international IPRs and IP treaties is relative to the short-run because, the narratives in support of 
the school of thought maintain that strict IPRs are needed to discourage complacency in 
innovation as economic development is gradually achieved. According to this school, while 
stringent IPRs are essential to encourage innovation, the period during which exclusive IPRs are 
held by innovators should be short in order to enable society to benefit from free acquisition and 
                         
4
 According to this strand of the literature, more stringent regimes in IPRs regimes should be adopted as nations 
make the transition from ‘developing countries’ to ‘developed countries’. Such strict IPRs regimes are likely to, 
inter alia: (i) favour technology transfer and innovation (Lee & Mansfield, 1996); (ii) boost exports (Maskus & 
Penubarti, 1995) and (iii) increase the possibility of investments from multinational corporations (see Mansfield, 
1994; Seyoum, 1996). This is also broadly consistent with a recent stream of literature on relevance of ICT on 
development outcomes in developing countries (Afutu-Kotey et al., 2017; Asongu & Boateng, 2018; Bongomin et 
al., 2018; Gosavi, 2018; Hubani & Wiese, 2018; Isszhaku et al., 2018; Minkoua Nzie et al., 2018; Muthinja & 
Chipeta,  2018; Abor et al., 2018 ).  
5
 Throughout this study, the terms ‘piracy’ and ‘software piracy’ are employed interchangeably.  
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distribution of knowledge once the period of exclusive IP is over. The perspective supported by 
this school is consistent with contemporary software piracy literature notably that software 
piracy boosts: copyright holders’ gains (Tunca & Wu, 2012); scientific publications (Asongu, 
2014a) and pro-poor development (Asongu, 2014b). The two schools of thought are apparent in 
both qualitative literature on the relevance of IPRs protection (Peitz & Waelbroeck, 2006; Lau, 
2006) and a growing stream of literature on drivers of piracy in the copyright industry (Andrés, 
2006a; Bezmen & Depken, 2006; Banerjee et al., 2005; Bezmen & Depken, 2004; Goel & 
Nelson, 2009).  
More contemporary literature on the fight against piracy in the software industry can be 
discussed in three main strands. The first deals with non-legal mechanisms by which software 
piracy can be mitigated, namely: community engagements, online-only, ‘making legal easier’ 
and digital rights management channels (Holm, 2014); self-control and social learning (Burruss 
et al., 2018; Omar & Ahmed, 2018) and a block chain approach (Bhawna et al., 2018). In the 
second, we find studies on common strategies for the harmonization of IPRs against software 
piracy (Asongu, 2013a; Andrés & Asongu, 2016). The third focuses on other mechanisms 
through which piracy can be curbed, namely: (i) good governance (Andrés & Asongu, 2013a); 
(ii) good institutions and human progress (Driouchi et al., 2015); (iii) Software User Identity 
Module (Adu et al., 2014); (iv) perceptions of equity and fairness  (Glass & Wood, 1996; 
Douglas et al., 2007); (v) informal institutions like religion (El-Baily & Gouda, 2011);  (vi) 
lawsuits targeting peer-to-peer networks and  corresponding customers (Tunca 2012); (vii) 
knowledge about punishment at stake (Yoo et al., 2011); (viii) democratic standards (Piquero &  
Piquero,  2006) and (ix) IPRs protection channels (Asongu et al., 2018), especially those that are 
contingent on codes of knowledge ethics in learning institutions (Santillanes & Felder, 2015) and 
legal origins  (Asongu, 2015). It is important to note that the above strands also entail: (i) the 
relevance of behaviour, psychology and norms; (ii) the influence of easy availability and utility 
of software tools that facilitate piracy and (iii) the influence of easy availability and utility of 
software tools that facilitate piracy. 
Noticeably, the above literature leaves space for improvement in understanding the role 
of technology in the persistence of software piracy. Knowing how technology affects the 
persistence of piracy is important because it enables more targeted policy initiatives on 
technology that accounts for more addiction to (or persistence in) software piracy relative to 
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technology with which less pirated software is used. Two main technologies are employed in this 
study, namely: internet penetration and PC users. Therefore, the research question this inquiry 
seeks to address is the following: are PC users or internet penetration more responsible for the 
persistence of piracy in the software industry? 
The theoretical underpinnings of persistence in software piracy are in line with the 
convergence literature which has been considerably documented within the framework of 
neoclassical models of growth (Swan, 1956; Barro, 1991; Solow, 1956; Baumol, 1986;  Mankiw 
et al., 1992; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995) and recently extended to other fields of 
economic development, notably: financial markets (Fung, 2009; Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno et 
al., 2012); human development (Mayer-Foulkes, 2010; Asongu, 2014c) and software piracy 
(Andrés & Asongu, 2013b, 2016). Convergence in software piracy that is contingent on 
technology adoption and IPRs can be expected for a multitude of reasons, inter alia: (i) the 
migration of experts and training of workers and students abroad (Kim & Nelson, 2000; Mowery 
& Sampat, 2005; Morrison et al., 2009); (ii) the changing nature of science and technology 
(D’Este & Patel, 2007; Mazzoleni & Nelson, 2007) which is facilitating cross-country 
collaboration and (iii) the phenomenon of globalization which is enhancing cross-country 
diffusion of knowledge (see Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). In summary, there is a wealth of 
literature on KE catch-up and/or persistence (Esler & Nelson 1998; Albuquerque, 2000; Jelili & 
Jellal, 2002; Wolff & Jellal, 2003; Mowery & Sampat 2005; Murray & Stern, 2005; Mazzoleni, 
2008).  
It is important to articulate why the internet and Personal Computers (PCs) are the 
adopted mechanisms of technology in this study on the one hand and on the other, which of the 
mechanisms is theoretically projected to be more influential. The indicator of software piracy is 
measured based on pirated software installed in PCs and the internet is a mechanism through 
which pirated software can be downloaded and distributed. It is anticipated that software piracy 
is more persistent through PCs compared to the internet because, as apparent in the next section, 
the conception and definition of software piracy is directly linked to the installation of pirated 
software in PCs.   
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology while Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes with 
implications and future research directions. 
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2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data  
 This inquiry examines a sample of 99 countries with data from three main sources, 
namely from the: World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO); Business Software Alliance 
(BSA) and World Bank Development Indicators (WDI). The periodicity is from 1994 to 2010. 
Restrictions to the number of countries and periodicity are essentially due to constraints in data 
availability at the time of the study.   
 The outcome indicator which is pirated software is defined as “the unauthorized copying 
of computer software which constitutes copyright infringement for either commercial or personal 
use” (SIIA, 2000)6. From a multidimensional spectrum, software piracy can be understood as 
organised individuals’ piracy and commercial or business piracy. There are three main types of 
software piracy, namely: counterfeiting, downloading and end-user copying. In the light of these 
differences in the conception of software piracy, the concern about deriving an appropriate 
indicator of software piracy has been longstanding in the literature. The present study defines 
software piracy as the variation between the demand for new software applications (which are 
computed on the basis of PC shipments) and software piracy that is actually supplied legally. 
Therefore, pirated software is measured as the percentage of software that is illegally installed 
annually (without a license) in a given country. The underlying variable ranges from 0% (a 
scenario of no piracy) to 100% (a scenario where all software installed is of pirated origin). More 
insights into information on the measurement of software piracy can be found in BSA (2007, 
2009)7. Though it is the object of some upward bias, software piracy data from BSA has been 
widely employed in the literature8.  
 Given that we are modeling the persistence of software piracy, our independent variable 
of interest is the estimated lagged value of software piracy. Three sets of independent variables 
are employed, notably: (i) technology indicators, (ii) IPRs laws and treaties and (iii) 
macroeconomic variables  
                         
6
 SIIA stands for Software and Information Industry Association.  
7
 For the most part, data from the BSA measures commercial software piracy. More insights into the reliability of 
the piracy data are available in the wealth of literature on the subject inter alia: Traphagan and Griffith (1998) and 
Png (2008).   
8The adopted software piracy measurement has been substantially employed in the literature (Marron & Steel, 2000; 
Andrés, 2006b; Goel & Nelson, 2009; Banerjee et al., 2005).  
 8 
 First, two variables of technology are adopted, namely: internet penetration and the 
number of Personal Computers (PCs). Whereas the choice of PCs is in accordance with the 
definition of software piracy, internet penetration is consistent with both intuition and recent KE 
literature (Tchamyou, 2017). The justification of this choice of technology variables has been 
provided in the penultimate paragraph of the introduction.  
 Second, the study considers six IPRs channels, namely: constitution, IPR law, main IP 
law, WIPO treaties, bilateral treaties and multilateral treaties. The choice of the variables is in 
line with the literature on the close linkage between IPRs laws and software piracy, which also 
embodies international treaties and legal frameworks (Holm, 2003; Andrés, 2006a; Van 
Kranenburg & Hogenbirk, 2005; Ki et al., 2006; Baghci et al., 2006; Asongu, 2013; Driouchi et 
al., 2015; Andrés & Asongu, 2016). The source of the IPRs indicator is the WIPO. The IP law 
and main IP law are laws that are enacted by the legislature and enforced by governance 
institutions while WIPO administered treaties are considered from the day they are enforced by 
the contracting nations. The relevant multilateral and bilateral agreements or treaties are 
computed in accordance with the day that they are enforced by the contracting parties. The main 
rationale for the inclusion of IPRs channels in the conditioning information set is that these are 
logically designed to enhance IPRs and by extension, the enhancement of IPRs entails the fight 
against software piracy. The choice of these IPRs control variable is consistent with recent 
literature (Asongu, 2015).                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 Third, three macroeconomic variables are also considered, namely: Population density, 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Research and Development (R& D) expenditure. The choice 
of these variables is in line with recent literature on software piracy (see Andrés & Goel, 2011, 
pp. 7-8; Asongu et al., 2018b).  Whereas the last two are anticipated to reduce software piracy, 
the first intuitively has the opposite effect. In essence, nations reflecting higher levels of GDP 
per capita are linked with relatively lower software piracy levels. This is for the most part 
because in less developed nations, citizens often lack the financial resources to buy the 
correct/legal software (Goel & Nelson, 2009; Moores & Esichaikul, 2011). The narrative of this 
expected sign also doubles as a justification for the anticipated impact of R&D. This is 
essentially because nations with high R&D expenditure are also likely to be comparatively 
wealthier nations. On the grounds of intuition, a growing population is very likely to be 
positively associated with aggregate software piracy because more citizens become exposed and 
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tempted to use pirated goods and services. It is important to note that this intuition is contingent 
on the stringency of IPRs laws and effectiveness of institutions. For instance, rates of piracy are 
much higher in Russia, which has a declining population than in the United States, which has a 
growing population. Beyond the rationales and intuition provided, the adopted control variables 
have been used in recent literature on the determinants of software piracy (Asongu et al., 2018b).   
Appendix 1 provides definitions of variables as well as their corresponding sources. The 
number of sampled countries is also disclosed in the appendix. The summary statistics and 
correlation matrix are respectively disclosed in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3. From the summary 
statistics, it is apparent that the variables under investigation are comparable. Moreover, given 
the variations in the corresponding standard deviations, we can be confident that reasonable 
estimated linkages will emerge. The purpose of the correlation matrix is to avoid concerns of 
multicollinearity that can affect the signs of estimated coefficients.  
 
2.2 Methodology  
2.2.1 Generalized method of moments: justification and specification  
 In accordance with information development literature on persistence (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017), the empirical strategy is the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). 
There are six main motivations underpinning the adoption of the estimation technique. The first 
is related to the line of inquiry, the second and third are requirements of the approach while the 
last three are advantages that are linked to the estimation strategy. First and foremost, the 
technique is consistent with the estimation of persistence because it is a dynamic process that 
involves the lagged dependent variable (Tchamyou et al., 2018). Second, the N(99)>T(17) 
criterion which is essential for applying the estimation technique is met because the number of 
cross sections (or countries) are substantially higher than the related number of years in each 
cross section (Efobi et al., 2018). Third, an exploratory analysis of the dependent variable reveals 
some evidence of persistence because the correlation between software piracy and its first lag 
(0.981) is above the 0.800 rule of thumb (Asongu et al., 2018c). Fourth, since the GMM strategy 
is in line with panel data structure, cross-country variations are included in the regressions 
(Arellano & Bover, 1995). Fifth, inherent biases in the difference estimator are considered in the 
system estimator (Blundell & Bond, 1998). Sixth, endogeneity is accounted-for by the estimation 
technique because the concern about simultaneity in the explanatory variables is tackled with an 
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instrumentation process (Roodman, 2009a,b). Moreover, the employment of time-invariant 
omitted indicators also improves the control for endogeneity.   
 Consistent with Bond et al. (2001), the system GMM estimator (see Arellano & Bover, 
1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) has better properties of estimation compared to the difference 
estimator (see Arellano & Bond, 1991). In this inquiry, we opt for the Roodman (2009ab) 
extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) because it has been documented to: (i) limit instrument 
proliferation or restrict over-identification and (ii) control for cross-sectional dependence (see 
Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008; Boateng et al., 2018). Hence, instead of adopting first 
differences, the extended estimation procedure adopts forward orthogonal deviations. 
A two-step procedure is adopted instead of a  one-step approach because it addresses 
concerns of heteroscedasticity given that the one-step procedure only controls for 
homoscedasticity. The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the 
standard system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where, tiSP ,
 
is software piracy of country i
 
in  period t ,  is a constant,
 
 represents the 
coefficient of auto-regression, t
 
is the time-specific constant, tiT ,  represents the technology (PC 
users and internet penetration) of country i
 
in  period t , tiIP ,  denotes intellectual property 
mechanisms (constitution, IPR law, main IP law, WIPO treaties, bilateral treaties and 
multilateral treaties) of country i
 
in  period t , tiTIP , is the interaction between T(technology) 
and IP (intellectual property mechanism) of country i
 
in  period t ,
 
tiW , captures the vector of 
control variables (GDP per capita, R&D expenditure and Population density) of country i
 
in  
period t ,
 
i
 
is the country-specific effects and ti ,  is the error term. The specification which is 
based on interactive regressions is also designed to articulate the fact that the sensitivity of 
software piracy to IPRs mechanisms is contingent on the specific technology channel through 
which the pirated software is consumed.  
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2.2.2 Identification and exclusion restrictions 
 Discussing properties of identification and articulating exclusion restrictions are 
important for a good specification GMM. Consistent with recent literature on the technique, all 
independent variables are acknowledged as suspected endogenous or predetermined indicators 
and only time-invariant omitted variables or year indicator are considered to exhibit strict 
exogeneity (see Boateng et al., 2018; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b; Tchamyou, 2018; 
Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017). The intuition for the underlying builds on the fact that it is not 
likely for the time-invariant omitted variables to become endogenous upon a first difference 
(Roodman, 2009)9.  
 With the above in mind, the time-invariant omitted variables impact software piracy 
exclusive through the predetermined variables. Furthermore, the statistical validity of the 
exclusion restriction is examined with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for instrument 
exogeneity. Accordingly, the alternative hypothesis of the DHT should not be accepted for the 
time-invariant omitted variables to explain the outcome variable exclusively via the 
predetermined indicators. Hence, in the results that are reported in Section 3, the assumption of 
exclusion restriction is validated if the null hypothesis of the DHT related to the instrumental 
variables (IV) (year, eq(diff)) is not rejected. This is broadly in accordance with the standard IV 
process in which, failure to reject the alternative hypothesis of Sargan Overidentifying 
Restrictions (OIR) test is an indication that the instruments affect the outcome variable through 
other mechanisms beside the suggested suspected endogenous variable channels (see Beck et al., 
2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c).  
 
3. Empirical results 
Table 1 and Table 2, present empirical findings corresponding to PC users and internet 
penetration, respectively. There are six specifications in each table corresponding to each IPR 
mechanism. For either table, the models are comparable because only technology variables 
change from one table to another. Hence, it can logically be deduced that the choice of the 
technology variable has a bearing on the estimated lagged dependent variable which is used to 
assess evidence of persistence in software piracy.  
 
                         
9
 Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for 
predetermined variables.  
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Table 1: Personal Computer Users and IPRs  
       
 Dependent variable: Software Piracy Rate 
       
Piracy (-1) 0.825 0.861*** 0.817*** 0.838 0.138 0.844*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.171) (0.735) (0.000) 
Constant 0.672 0.434 0.722 0.838 0.874*** 0.825 
 (0.527) (0.133) (0.235) (0.171) (0.000) (0.196) 
Personal Computer Users (PC)   0.017 0.024 0.009 -0.026 0.001 0.025 
 (0.761) (0.402) (0.811) (0.547) (0.971) (0.584) 
Constitution  0.084 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.219)      
Main IP Law --- 0.021** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.032)     
IP Law --- --- 0.009* --- --- --- 
   (0.077)    
WIPO Treaties --- --- --- -0.0005 --- --- 
    (0.971)   
Multilateral Treaties  --- --- --- --- 0.0007 --- 
     (0.863)  
Bilateral  Treaties  --- --- --- --- --- 0.001 
      (0.744) 
Constitution×PC -0.015 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.402)      
Main IP Law×PC --- -0.005** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.026)     
IP Law×PC --- --- -0.001 --- --- --- 
   (0.173)    
WIPO Treaties×PC --- --- --- 0.002 --- --- 
    (0.602)   
Multilateral Treaties×PC  --- --- --- --- -0.0007 --- 
     (0.572)  
Bilateral  Treaties×PC --- --- --- --- --- -0.00007 
      (0.949) 
Gross Domestic Product  -0.106 -0.101** -0.132 -0.136 -0.043 -0.149* 
 (0.441) (0.030) (0.139) (0.124) (0.491) (0.071) 
Research & Development  -0.020 -0.012* -0.016* -0.015 -0.015* -0.013* 
 (0.052) (0.078) (0.091) (0.201) (0.085) (0.057) 
Population  -0.038 -0.012 -0.031 -0.025 0.010*** -0.043 
 (0.692) (0.673) (0.527) (0.647) (0.777) (0.457) 
     
 
 
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
AR(1) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2) (0.161) (0.142) (0.151) (0.158) (0.166) (0.153) 
Sargan OIR (0.472) (0.482) (0.385) (0.003) (0.013) (0.378) 
Hansen OIR (0.668) (0.425) (0.639) (0.603) (0.189) (0.456) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.467) (0.723) (0.459) (0.728) (0.251) (0.500) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.671) (0.257) (0.645) (0.433) (0.203) (0.398) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.410) (0.448) (0.416) (0.315) (0.027) (0.571) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.695) (0.392) (0.690) (0.737) (0.756) (0.350) 
       
Fisher  403.58**** 1194.22*** 574.85*** 554.51*** 1931.88*** 1459.05*** 
Instruments  36 39 39 39 39 39 
Countries  84 84 84 84 84 84 
Observations  702 702 702 702 702 702 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. IP: Intellectual Property. PC: Personal Computers. WIPO: World Intellectual 
Property Organisation. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying 
Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. 
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Table 2: Internet penetration and IPRs  
       
 Dependent variable: Software Piracy Rate 
       
Piracy (-1) 0.828*** 0.844*** 0.817*** 0.784*** 0.821*** 0.853*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.957** 1.186*** 1.276*** 2.624*** 1.752*** 0.815** 
 (0.019) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) 
Internet Penetration (Internet) 0.037** 0.038** 0.025 0.008 (0.030)* 0.022 
 (0.020) (0.036) (0.112) (0.689) (0.067) (0.148) 
Constitution  0.080** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.034)      
Main IP Law --- 0.011 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.163)     
IP Law --- --- 0.0001 --- --- --- 
   (0.953)    
WIPO Treaties --- --- --- -0.040*** --- --- 
    (0.008)   
Multilateral Treaties  --- --- --- --- -0.008** --- 
     (0.019)  
Bilateral  Treaties  --- --- --- --- --- -0.003 
      (0.583) 
Constitution×Internet  -0.016* --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.095)      
Main IP Law×Internet --- -0.002 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.303)     
IP Law×Internet --- --- 0.0007 --- --- --- 
   (0.362)    
WIPO Treaties×Internet --- --- --- 0.013*** --- --- 
    (0.001)   
Multilateral Treaties×Internet --- --- --- --- 0.002** --- 
     (0.026)  
Bilateral  Treaties×Internet --- --- --- --- --- 0.0008 
      (0.577) 
Gross Domestic Product  -0.184*** -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.404 -0.285*** -0.173*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) 
Research & Development  -0.010 -0.0002 -0.005 0.015 0.006 -0.002 
 (0.252) (0.974) (0.553) (0.276) (0.459) (0.764) 
Population  -0.044 -0.054* -0.058** -0.138*** -0.092*** -0.027 
 (0.126) (0.063) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.274) 
  
    
 
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
AR(1) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2) (0.136) (0.134) (0.128) (0.150) (0.135) (0.128) 
Sargan OIR (0.240) (0.199) (0.138) (0.000) (0.050) (0.115) 
Hansen OIR (0.276) (0.136) (0.190) (0.132) (0.153) (0.299) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.578) (0.181) (0.211) (0.248) (0.117) (0.633) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.180) (0.203) (0.262) (0.155) (0.304) (0.183) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.133) (0.101) (0.606) (0.177) (0.039) (0.069) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.527) (0.314) (0.095) (0.204) (0.579) (0.739) 
       
Fisher  1142.77*** 1693.02*** 1073.97*** 481.70*** 1548.36*** 1728.85*** 
Instruments  39 39 39 39 39 39 
Countries  86 86 86 86 86 86 
Observations  713 713 713 713 713 713 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. IP: Intellectual Property. PC: Personal Computers. WIPO: World Intellectual 
Property Organisation.  DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying 
Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the  OIR and DHT tests. 
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Four principal information criteria are employed to assess the validity of the GMM model 
with forward orthogonal deviations10. Based on the criteria, the following findings are 
established. First, software piracy is persistent in three of the six specifications in Table 1 
whereas the corresponding persistence in Table 2 is not apparent in all of the six specifications 
because they are overwhelmingly stationary. In other words, the findings on PC users are weakly 
stationary. The assimilation of non-stationarity to persistence is consistent with Mishra and 
Smyth (2014). Second, most of the significant control variables have the expected signs.  
 It is important to articulate the criterion for stationarity which is based on the estimated 
lagged dependent variable. Evidence of convergence or a stationary process is established when 
the absolute values of the lagged outcome indicator is in the interval of zero and one. This is 
consistent with Fung (2009, p.58) and Asongu (2013, p. 49). Such criterion has been used in 
recent information persistence literature (see Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b).  
 Accordingly, in order for persistence to be established, the estimated lagged endogenous 
or outcome variable should be significant on the one hand and on the other, satisfy the 
convergence criterion. Note should be taken of the fact that, the estimated coefficients related to 
the dependent variable can be directly reported. Alternatively, beta could be derived by 
subtracting one from the estimated lagged coefficient. Within this alternative framework, the 
criterion for establishing convergence is a beta that is less than zero. Hence, following recent 
literature, we have directly reported the estimated lagged dependent variables (Prochniak & 
Witkowski, 2012a, p. 20; Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012b, p. 23; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d, 
p. 459). 
 Given the above insights, the criterion for establishing comparative persistence from PC 
vis-à-vis internet penetration is as follows: when the two tables are compared, the tables with 
estimated lagged coefficients reflecting higher magnitude are acknowledged to reflect more 
persistence. Accordingly, the relevance of magnitude in the estimated lagged value for the 
establishment of more persistence is consistent with recent literature (Asongu & Acha-Anyi, 
                         
10
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for 
the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-
identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that 
instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but 
not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict 
identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number 
of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments 
is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint 
validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
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2018; Asongu, 2018). This is essentially because a lagged estimated magnitude translates how 
past values of software piracy influence future values of software piracy.  
 It is also important to elucidate how PCs and internet penetration used in conditioning 
information set contribute to persistence in software piracy. Accordingly, the specifications in 
Table 1 and Table 2 are comparable because, with the exceptions of PCs and the internet (which 
are our main variables of interest), the other variables in the conditioning information set are the 
same (Andrés & Asongu, 2013a). Whereas absolute persistence/convergence is modeled without 
variables in the conditioning information set, conditional persistence/convergence involves a set 
of control variables or variables in the conditioning information set (Narayan et al., 2011). 
Conditional persistence is the type of persistence/convergence that occurs because of cross-
country differences in factors that determined the outcome variables (or software piracy) 
(Narayan et al., 2011). Given that the main distinguishing feature between Table 1 and Table 2 
are PCs and internet penetration, it is reasonable to infer that the changes in persistence across 
tables is traceable to the type of technology used in the regression.  
 
4. Concluding implications, caveats and future research directions  
 
This study has examined the persistence of software piracy with internet penetration vis-à-vis PC 
users, conditional on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) institutions. The empirical evidence is 
based on a panel of 99 countries for the period 1994-2010 and the Generalised Method of 
Moments with forward orthogonal deviations. The main finding is that, compared to internet 
penetration, PC usage is more responsible for the persistence of global software piracy.  
Knowing how technology affects the persistence of piracy is important because it enables 
more targeted policy initiatives. We have shown that the sensitivity of software piracy to IPRs 
mechanisms is contingent on the specific technology channels through which the pirated 
software is consumed. As a main policy implication, the choice and design of IPR treaties/laws 
against software piracy should be contingent on technologies with which pirated software is 
used. As far as these findings are concerned, in the choice between internet penetration and PC 
usage, devoting resources to the targeting of the latter would contribute more towards reducing 
sustained software piracy. The conception and definition of software piracy should be extended 
(to other hardware such as mobile phones and internet-linked hardware applications) and not 
exclusively limited to PCs. Hence, while the study recommends that policy makers should focus 
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more on PCs as opposed to internet penetration in order to limit the persistence of pirated 
software, it is also relevant to note that other contemporary  hardware that  use pirated software 
include: Iphones and Ipads which have most software-related technical facilities available in 
PCs. Moreover, policy should also be cautious of the fact that persistence in a development 
outcome is contingent on the variables used in the conditioning information set. Hence, it is 
relevant to engage many determinants of software piracy in the modelling exercise. This is 
essentially because conditional persistence (which we have modelled) is apparent when there are 
cross-country differences in factors that affect the outcome variable. Hence, the policy relevance 
of our findings is contingent on determinants involved in the conditioning information set.  
In the light of the above, a caveat to this study is that technology has been conceived and 
measured in terms of personal computers (i.e. hardware) and internet penetration (i.e. software). 
However, there are many hardware and software associated with piracy. Considering these 
alternative factors (e.g. such as cloud computing) within the framework of future studies, as 
more data become available, is fundamental in improving the established findings and extant 
literature. Moreover, future research can improve the existing literature by assessing other 
technology and IPRs mechanisms. Another caveat of the study is based on data availability 
constraints at the time of the study. Hence the use of more contemporary data is warranted in 
future studies. These potential studies should also consider the heterogeneity of the dataset and 
the nature of the software industry which has changed since 1994.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Definition of variables  
Variables  Abbreviation Definition of variables (Measurements) Sources 
    
Piracy Piracy Logarithm of Piracy rate (annual %) BSA 
    
Growth per capita GDP Logarithm of GDP per Capita, PPP (international constant 
dollars, 2005) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Research and 
Development  
R & D Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Internet Penetration Internet Logarithm of Internet Users per 1000   GMID 
    
PC Users  PC Logarithm of PC Users per capita  GMID 
    
Population  Pop. Logarithm of Population  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Constitution  Const. Dummy variable: Copyright is mentioned in the 
constitution  
WIPO 
    
Main_IP_law MIPlaw Main Intellectual Property Law WIPO 
    
IP_rlaw IPlaw Intellectual Property Rights Law WIPO 
    
Wipotreaties WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization  WIPO 
    
Mutilateral Multi. Multilateral Treaties  WIPO 
    
Bilateral Bilat.  Bilateral  Treaties  WIPO 
    
WDI: World Bank’s World Development Indicators. BSA: Business Software Alliance. GMID: Global Market Information Database. GDP: Gross 
Domestic Product. Log: Logarithm. WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization.  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics (1994-2010) 
Panel A: Summary Statistics  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Obs 
  
     
Dependent 
Variable  
Software Piracy rate (ln transformed) 0.255 0.449 -0.602 1.995 1500 
       
 
Technology and 
control variables  
GDP per capita (log) 4.006 0.433 3.008 4.924 1643 
Research & Development (R & D) 1.079 0.963 0.006 4.864 811 
Internet Penetration (log) 2.807 1.183 -1.000 5.622 1616 
Personal Computer Users (log) 3.009 0.837 0.698 5.464 1557 
Population (log) 7.063 0.712 5.424 9.126 1682 
       
 
IPRs laws and 
treaties  related 
Constitution 0.242 0.428 0.000 1 1683 
Main IP Law 2.134 2.550 0.000 20 1683 
IP Law 2.260 4.669 0.000 47 1683 
WIPO Treaties  3.455 1.877 0.000 7 1683 
Multilateral Treaties  10.594 5.816 0.000 25 1683 
Bilateral Treaties  0.998 2.532 0.000 21 1683 
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Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
“Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia, 
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China,  Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Guatemala,  Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, UAE, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia”.  
 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. ICT: Information and Communication Technology.  Scandi: Scandinavian. Obs: 
Observations.  
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix     
             
Piracy GDP R & D Internet PC Pop. Const. MIPlaw IPrlaw WIPO Multi. Bilat. 
 
             
1.000 -0.766 -0.703 -0.503 -0.551 0.009 0.108 -0.405 -0.109 -0.215 -0.534 -0.180 Piracy  
 1.000 0.653 0.386 0.482 -0.206 -0.173 0.285 0.067 0.077 0.376 0.160 GDP 
  1.000 0.424 0.530 0.044 -0.161 0.221 -0.042 0.035 0.414 0.248 R & D 
   1.000 0.897 0.609 0.145 0.284 0.196 0.119 0.316 0.299 Internet 
    1.000 0.688 0.123 0.286 0.197 0.036 0.319 0.340 PCs 
     1.000 0.269 0.068 0.179 -0.087 0.031 0.231 Pop. 
      1.000 0.075 0.348 0.068 -0.098 0.241 Const. 
       1.000 0.513 0.168 0.184 -0.087 MIPlaw 
        1.000 0.209 0.147 -0.006 IPlaw 
         1.000 0.569 0.176 WIPO 
          1.000 0.078 Multi. 
           1.000 Bilat. 
             
GDP: GDP per capita. R&D: Research and Development. Internet: Internet penetration. PC: Personal Computer Users. Pop: 
Population. Const: Constitution. MIPlaw: Main Intellectual Property Law. IPrlaw: Intellectual Property Rights Law. WIPO: 
World Intellectual Property Organization Treaties. Multi: Multilateral Treaties. Bilat: Bilateral Treaties.  
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